Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We present a macroeconomic agent-based model that combines several mechanisms operating at the same timescale, while remaining mathematically tractable. It comprises enterprises and workers who compete in a job market and a commodity goods…
We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
This paper develops a mean field game framework for dynamic two-sided matching markets, extending existing matching theory by integrating micro-macro dynamics in two-sided environments. Unlike traditional matching models focusing on static…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…