Related papers: Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion

We study a regularized variant of the Bayesian Persuasion problem, where the receiver's decision process includes a divergence-based penalty that accounts for deviations from perfect rationality. This modification smooths the underlying…

Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard…

Autonomous agents operating in sequential decision-making tasks under uncertainty can benefit from external action suggestions, which provide valuable guidance but inherently vary in reliability. Existing methods for incorporating such…

A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…

In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver's problem. A signal is optimal iff the…

We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…

We study a social learning model in which agents iteratively update their beliefs about the true state of the world using private signals and the beliefs of other agents in a non-Bayesian manner. Some agents are stubborn, meaning they…

We study a nonlinear dynamics of binary opinions in a population of agents connected by a directed network, influenced by two competing forces. On the one hand, agents are stubborn, i.e., have a tendency for one of the two opinions; on the…

I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…

This paper characterizes the conditions under which the observed beliefs of a group of agents are consistent with Bayesian updating. Beliefs are consistent with Bayesianism if they arise from the application of Bayes' rule given some…

We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…

We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium…

We consider distributed learning problem in games with an unknown cost-relevant parameter, and aim to find the Nash equilibrium while learning the true parameter. Inspired by the social learning literature, we propose a distributed…