Related papers: Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion
In preference-based reinforcement learning (RL), an agent interacts with the environment while receiving preferences instead of absolute feedback. While there is increasing research activity in preference-based RL, the design of formal…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…
We investigate the strategic behavior of a large population of agents who decide whether to adopt a costly partially effective protection or remain unprotected against the susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemic. In contrast with most…
Interactive systems such as chatbots and games are increasingly used to persuade and educate on sustainability-related topics, yet it remains unclear how different delivery formats shape learning and persuasive outcomes when content is held…
Interest in how democracies form consensus has increased recently, with statistical physics and economics approaches both suggesting that there is convergence to a fixed point in belief networks, but with fluctuations in opinions when there…
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…
In this article, I investigate the use of Bayesian updating rules applied to modeling social agents in the case of continuos opinions models. Given another agent statement about the continuous value of a variable $x$, we will see that…
This paper provides a behavioral analysis of conservatism in beliefs. I introduce a new axiom, Dynamic Conservatism, that relaxes Dynamic Consistency when information and prior beliefs "conflict." When the agent is a subjective expected…
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…
This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
Real-world applications of reinforcement learning for recommendation and experimentation faces a practical challenge: the relative reward of different bandit arms can evolve over the lifetime of the learning agent. To deal with these…
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…
Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…
This paper proposes a new approach to training recommender systems called deviation-based learning. The recommender and rational users have different knowledge. The recommender learns user knowledge by observing what action users take upon…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…