Related papers: Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback
For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--and most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this…
We study how to adapt to smoothly-varying ('easy') environments in well-known online learning problems where acquiring information is expensive. For the problem of label efficient prediction, which is a budgeted version of prediction with…
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding…
We tackle a new emerging problem, which is finding an optimal monopartite matching in a weighted graph. The semi-bandit version, where a full matching is sampled at each iteration, has been addressed by \cite{ADMA}, creating an algorithm…
Two-player zero-sum games of infinite duration and their quantitative versions are used in verification to model the interaction between a controller (Eve) and its environment (Adam). The question usually addressed is that of the existence…
This paper proposes new, end-to-end deep reinforcement learning algorithms for learning two-player zero-sum Markov games. Different from prior efforts on training agents to beat a fixed set of opponents, our objective is to find the Nash…
We develop a novel and generic algorithm for the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem (or more generally the combinatorial semi-bandit problem). When instantiated differently, our algorithm achieves various new data-dependent regret…
We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant $\varepsilon>0$, obtains $\varepsilon T$-swap regret within only $T = \mathsf{polylog}(n)$ rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the…
We study the $K$-armed contextual dueling bandit problem, a sequential decision making setting in which the learner uses contextual information to make two decisions, but only observes \emph{preference-based feedback} suggesting that one…
We study a stochastic differential game with $N$ competitive players in a linear-quadratic framework with ergodic cost, where $d$-dimensional diffusion processes govern the state dynamics with an unknown common drift (matrix). Assuming a…
This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
We propose a novel online learning method for minimizing regret in large extensive-form games. The approach learns a function approximator online to estimate the regret for choosing a particular action. A no-regret algorithm uses these…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…
We prove that optimistic-follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL), together with smooth value updates, finds an $O(T^{-1})$-approximate Nash equilibrium in $T$ iterations for two-player zero-sum Markov games with full information. This…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…
The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when…
Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when…