Related papers: A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Au…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…
We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the…
In the compulsive gambler process there is a finite set of agents who meet pairwise at random times ($i$ and $j$ meet at times of a rate-$\nu_{ij}$ Poisson process) and, upon meeting, play an instantaneous fair game in which one wins the…
Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…
We develop a systematic approach to quantum probability as a theory of rational betting in quantum gambles. In these games of chance the agent is betting in advance on the outcomes of several (finitely many) incompatible measurements. One…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…
This work studies the problem of ad hoc teamwork in teams composed of agents with differing computational capabilities. We consider cooperative multi-player games in which each agent's policy is constrained by a private capability…
We study a model of moral hazard with heterogeneous beliefs where each of agent's actions gives rise to a pair of probability distributions over output levels, one representing the beliefs of the agent and the other those of the principal.…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
We consider how an agent should update her beliefs when her beliefs are represented by a set P of probability distributions, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax criterion, perhaps the best-studied and most commonly-used…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Many multiagent applications require an agent to learn quickly how to interact with previously unknown other agents. To address this problem, researchers have studied learning algorithms which compute posterior beliefs over a hypothesised…
This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…
The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…
We introduce a graceful approach to probabilistic inference called bounded conditioning. Bounded conditioning monotonically refines the bounds on posterior probabilities in a belief network with computation, and converges on final…
We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…