Related papers: A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Au…
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different…
We introduce frame-equivalence games tailored for reasoning about the size, modal depth, number of occurrences of symbols and number of different propositional variables of modal formulae defining a given frame-property. Using these games,…
Combinatorial Game Theory is a branch of mathematics and theoretical computer science that studies sequential 2-player games with perfect information. Normal play is the convention where a player who cannot move loses. Here, we generalize…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every player is assigned positive probability. Morris (1991,1994) established an epistemological-behavioral duality characterisation…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
We study cautious reasoning in finite sequential games played by agents with perfect recall. Our contribution lies in formulating a definition of prudent rationalizability (Heifetz et al. 2021, BEJTE) as an iterative reduction procedure of…
The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…
Game theory has been developed by scientists as a theory of strategic interaction among players who are supposed to be perfectly rational. These strategic interactions might have been presented in an auction, a business negotiation, a chess…
Gallice and Monz\'on (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents…
This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may encounter an 'honest' type who always cooperates.…
We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers…
We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…
Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an \textit{subjective identity} and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. The…
Recent approaches to goal recognition have leveraged planning landmarks to achieve high-accuracy with low runtime cost. These approaches, however, lack a probabilistic interpretation. Furthermore, while most probabilistic models to goal…
In a vintage paper concerning Parsimonious games, a subset of constant sum homogeneous weighted majority games, Isbell introduced a twin relationship based on transposition properties of the incidence matrices upon minimal winning…
In two-player cooperative games, agents can play together effectively when they have accurate assumptions about how their teammate will behave, but may perform poorly when these assumptions are inaccurate. In language games, failure may be…
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference sets that can appear for a dominant strategy incentive…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents actions and beliefs are determined aleatorically, or "by the throw of dice". This system consists of possible worlds that assign distributions to independent random variables, and agents who…