Related papers: Partition-based Stability of Coalitional Games
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition…
In this paper, we investigate cooperative platoon formation and benefit allocation in mixed-energy truck fleets composed of both electric and fuel-powered trucks. The central challenge arises from the platoon-size constraint, which limits…
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they…
The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games thanks to its attractive properties - it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. Although computing the nucleolus is very…
We study PAC learnability and PAC stabilizability of Hedonic Games (HGs), i.e., efficiently inferring preferences or core-stable partitions from samples. We first expand the known learnability/stabilizability landscape for some of the most…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport…
Coalitional control is concerned with the management of multi-agent systems where cooperation cannot be taken for granted (due to, e.g., market competition, logistics). This paper proposes a model predictive control (MPC) framework aimed at…
A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand…
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
Unlicensed secondary users (SUs) in cognitive radio networks are subject to an inherent tradeoff between spectrum sensing and spectrum access. Although each SU has an incentive to sense the primary user (PU) channels for locating spectrum…