Attacking Power Indices by Manipulating Player Reliability
Computer Science and Game Theory
2019-05-17 v2 Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems
Social and Information Networks
Abstract
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable, even though computing power indices is feasible.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1903.01165,
title = {Attacking Power Indices by Manipulating Player Reliability},
author = {Gabriel Istrate and Cosmin Bonchiş and Alin Brînduşescu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.01165},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
A revised version of this manuscript will appear in the Proceedings of AAMAS'2019