Solidarity to achieve stability
Theoretical Economics
2023-10-06 v2
Abstract
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2302.07618,
title = {Solidarity to achieve stability},
author = {Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.07618},
year = {2023}
}