Related papers: PAC learning and stabilizing Hedonic Games: toward…
In hedonic diversity games (HDGs), recently introduced by Bredereck, Elkind and Igarashi (2019), each agent belongs to one of two classes (men and women, vegetarians and meat-eaters, junior and senior researchers), and agents' preferences…
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are given a graph whose vertices represent $n$ selfish agents and the weight of each edge $uv$ denotes how much agent $u$ gains (or loses) when she is placed in…
An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
Hedonic games formalize coalition formation scenarios where players evaluate an outcome based on the coalition they are contained in. Due to a large number of possible coalitions, compact representations of these games are crucial. We…
Hedonic games are a prominent model of coalition formation, in which each agent's utility only depends on the coalition she resides. The subclass of hedonic games that models the formation of general partnerships, where output is shared…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as…
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…
This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the…
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $\alpha$-hedonic…
The Fundamental Theorem of PAC Learning asserts that learnability of a concept class $H$ is equivalent to the $\textit{uniform convergence}$ of empirical error in $H$ to its mean, or equivalently, to the problem of $\textit{density…
An agnostic PAC learning algorithm finds a predictor that is competitive with the best predictor in a benchmark hypothesis class, where competitiveness is measured with respect to a given loss function. However, its predictions might be…
We introduce friend- and enemy-oriented hedonic games with strangers (FOHGS and EOHGS respectively), two classes of hedonic games wherein agents are classified as friends, enemies, or strangers under the assumption that strangers will…
Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a prominent model of coalition formation where agents' preferences are derived from their individual valuations of peers. While social welfare maximization in ASHGs has traditionally focused…
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…