Related papers: Reasoning about Dependence, Preference and Coaliti…

We propose enhancing the use of propositions for denoting decisions and strategies as established in temporal languages such as CTL*, if interpreted on concurrent game models. The enhancement enables specifying varying coalition structure.…

Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In two recent papers, Li and Ju argued that generally, concurrent game models, models of Coalition Logic, have three too strong assumptions: seriality,…

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…

Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…

Purely affective interaction allows the welfare of an individual to depend on her own actions and on the profile of welfare levels of others. Under an assumption on the structure of mutual affection that we interpret as "non-explosive…

Ensuring that AI systems make strategic decisions aligned with the specified preferences in adversarial sequential interactions is a critical challenge for developing trustworthy AI systems, especially when the environment is stochastic and…

We introduce fixpoint definitions, a rule-based reformulation of fixpoint constructs. The logic FO(FD), an extension of classical logic with fixpoint definitions, is defined. We illustrate the relation between FO(FD) and FO(ID), which is…

We study hidden-variable models from quantum mechanics, and their abstractions in purely probabilistic and relational frameworks, by means of logics of dependence and independence, based on team semantics. We show that common desirable…

In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…

This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…

LLMs are increasingly used to make or support high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, where alignment depends not only on factual accuracy but on how models weigh tradeoffs between different outcomes. We present an empirical pipeline for…

Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL was invented as a logic for reasoning about regular programming constructs. We propose a new perspective on PDL as a multi-agent strategic logic (MASL). This logic for strategic reasoning has group…

We study the convergence properties of decentralized fictitious play (DFP) for the class of near-potential games where the incentives of agents are nearly aligned with a potential function. In DFP, agents share information only with their…

The effect of population heterogeneity in multi-agent learning is practically relevant but remains far from being well-understood. Motivated by this, we introduce a model of multi-population learning that allows for heterogeneous beliefs…

The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership…

We introduce a new variant of dependence logic called Boolean dependence logic. In Boolean dependence logic dependence atoms are of the type =(x_1,...,x_n,\alpha), where \alpha is a Boolean variable. Intuitively, with Boolean dependence…

The Facility Location Problem (FLP) is a well-studied optimization problem with applications in many real-world scenarios. Past literature has explored the solutions from different perspectives to tackle FLPs. These include investigating…

Propositional team logic is the propositional analog to first-order team logic. Non-classical atoms of dependence, independence, inclusion, exclusion and anonymity can be expressed in it, but for all atoms except dependence only exponential…