Related papers: Reasoning about Dependence, Preference and Coaliti…
Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) is an emerging paradigm to align models with human preferences. Typically, RLHF aggregates preferences from multiple individuals who have diverse viewpoints that may conflict with each…
We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent…
We present a logic named L_{LF} whose intended use is to formalize properties of specifications developed in the dependently typed lambda calculus LF. The logic is parameterized by the LF signature that constitutes the specification. Atomic…
Differential game logic (dGL) is a logic for specifying and verifying properties of hybrid games, i.e. games that combine discrete, continuous, and adversarial dynamics. Unlike hybrid systems, hybrid games allow choices in the system…
Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Logic Programs with Ordered Disjunction (LPODs) extend classical logic programs with the capability of expressing preferential disjunctions in the heads of program rules. The initial semantics of LPODs, although simple and quite intuitive,…
Modal dependence logics are modal logics defined on the basis of team semantics and have the downward closure property. In this paper, we introduce sound and complete deduction systems for the major modal dependence logics, especially those…
Self-play reinforcement learning has demonstrated significant success in learning complex strategic and interactive behaviors in competitive multi-agent games. However, achieving such behaviors in continuous decision spaces remains…
LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of cores of games, right from the early days of this notion to the present time. The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} introduced the "right" way of…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection…
Logical reasoning is a key task for artificial intelligence due to it's role in major downstream tasks such as Question Answering, Summarization. Recent methods in improving the reasoning ability of LLMs fall short in correctly converting a…
Reinforcement learning is a general method for learning in sequential settings, but it can often be difficult to specify a good reward function when the task is complex. In these cases, preference feedback or expert demonstrations can be…
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…