Related papers: Game Redesign in No-regret Game Playing
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…
The Competing Bandits framework is a recently emerging area that integrates multi-armed bandits in online learning with stable matching in game theory. While conventional models assume that all players and arms are constantly available, in…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We propose the first regret-based approach to the Graphical Bilinear Bandits problem, where $n$ agents in a graph play a stochastic bilinear bandit game with each of their neighbors. This setting reveals a combinatorial NP-hard problem that…
Under the assumptions that (i) gamification consists of various types of users that experience game design elements differently; and (ii) gamification is deployed in order to achieve some goal in the broadest sense, we pose the gamification…
This paper considers no-regret learning for repeated continuous-kernel games with lossy bandit feedback. Since it is difficult to give the explicit model of the utility functions in dynamic environments, the players' action can only be…
We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…
We study learning in a dynamically evolving environment modeled as a Markov game between a learner and a strategic opponent that can adapt to the learner's strategies. While most existing works in Markov games focus on external regret as…
No-regret self-play learning dynamics have become one of the premier ways to solve large-scale games in practice. Accelerating their convergence via improving the regret of the players over the naive $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound after $T$ rounds has…
A formula is presented for designing zero-determinant(ZD) strategies of general finite games, which have $n$ players and players can have different numbers of strategies. To this end, using semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile…
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least…
Game designs often center on the game mechanics---rules governing the logical evolution of the game. We seek to develop an intelligent system that generates computer games. As first steps towards this goal we present a composable and…
We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…
We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we…
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in…
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…
Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…
Recent literature on online learning has focused on developing adaptive algorithms that take advantage of a regularity of the sequence of observations, yet retain worst-case performance guarantees. A complementary direction is to develop…
We study repeated multi-player vector-valued games in which a player observes a payoff vector each round and evaluates outcomes through linear scalarizations of those vectors. Different from most prior works, the choice of scalarization is…