Related papers: Game Redesign in No-regret Game Playing

The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…

We consider the problem of online learning where the sequence of actions played by the learner must adhere to an unknown safety constraint at every round. The goal is to minimize regret with respect to the best safe action in hindsight…

We provide a novel reduction from swap-regret minimization to external-regret minimization, which improves upon the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour [BM07] and Stolz-Lugosi [SL05] in that it does not require finiteness of the space of…

No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…

Motivated by the stringent safety requirements that are often present in real-world applications, we study a safe online convex optimization setting where the player needs to simultaneously achieve sublinear regret and zero constraint…

This work studies external regret in sequential prediction games with both positive and negative payoffs. External regret measures the difference between the payoff obtained by the forecasting strategy and the payoff of the best action. In…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

We present an algorithm which attains O(\sqrt{T}) internal (and thus external) regret for finite games with partial monitoring under the local observability condition. Recently, this condition has been shown by (Bartok, Pal, and Szepesvari,…

We study the power of different types of adaptive (nonoblivious) adversaries in the setting of prediction with expert advice, under both full-information and bandit feedback. We measure the player's performance using a new notion of regret,…

We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model: arriving individuals are aware of the current model, and invest strategically in modifying their own features so as to improve the predicted score…

A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs determined by an unknown state of the world. Traditionally,…

An urban planner might design the spatial layout of transportation amenities so as to improve accessibility for underserved communities -- a fairness objective. However, implementing such a design might trigger processes of neighborhood…

Reinforcement-learning agents seek to maximize a reward signal through environmental interactions. As humans, our job in the learning process is to design reward functions to express desired behavior and enable the agent to learn such…

Publishers who publish their content on the web act strategically, in a behavior that can be modeled within the online learning framework. Regret, a central concept in machine learning, serves as a canonical measure for assessing the…

Algorithmic recourse provides individuals who receive undesirable outcomes from machine learning systems with minimum-cost improvements to achieve a desirable outcome. However, machine learning models often get updated, so the recourse may…

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…

Regret minimization is treated as the golden rule in the traditional study of online learning. However, regret minimization algorithms tend to converge to the static optimum, thus being suboptimal for changing environments. To address this…

To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…

The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…