Related papers: Semi-Random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…
We consider election scenarios with incomplete information, a situation that arises often in practice. There are several models of incomplete information and accordingly, different notions of outcomes of such elections. In one well-studied…
Combinatorial preference aggregation has many applications in AI. Given the exponential nature of these preferences, compact representations are needed and ($m$)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two…
The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl,…
We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…
In the Byzantine agreement problem, n nodes with possibly different input values aim to reach agreement on a common value in the presence of t < n/3 Byzantine nodes which represent arbitrary failures in the system. This paper introduces a…
Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
In several decision-making problems, alternatives should be ranked on the basis of paired comparisons between them. We present an axiomatic approach for the universal ranking problem with arbitrary preference intensities, incomplete and…
Stated choice probabilities are increasingly used in conjunction with the random-coefficient model (RCM) to describe individual preferences. They allow survey respondents to express uncertainty about the future or the incompleteness of a…
A specter is haunting consensus protocols--the specter of adversary majority. Dolev and Strong in 1983 showed an early possibility for up to 99% adversaries. Yet, other works show impossibility results for adversaries above 50% under…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that…
We conjecture that Borda count is the ranked choice voting method that best preserves the outcome of an election with randomly corrupted votes, among all fair voting methods with small influences satisfying the Condorcet Loser Criterion.…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…
The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…