Welfare Maximization Entices Participation
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-08-17 v1 Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two important corollaries of our results are characterizations of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to a well-known result by Moulin (1988), who proves that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1508.03538,
title = {Welfare Maximization Entices Participation},
author = {Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt and Johannes Hofbauer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.03538},
year = {2015}
}