A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure
Artificial Intelligence
2013-04-24 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility of each agent is computable in polynomial time. Using this result, we prove that the expected utilitarian social welfare is maximized when agents take alternate turns. We also argue that this mechanism remains optimal when agents behave strategically
Cite
@article{arxiv.1304.5892,
title = {A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure},
author = {Thomas Kalinowski and Nina Nardoytska and Toby Walsh},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1304.5892},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
To appear in the Proceedings of IJCAI 2013, International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence