Welfare of Sequential Allocation Mechanisms for Indivisible Goods
Artificial Intelligence
2018-01-17 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but may not have an optimal social welfare. We consider therefore the relation between welfare and efficiency. We study the (computational) questions of what welfare is possible or necessary depending on the choice of policy. We also consider a novel control problem in which the chair chooses a policy to improve social welfare.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1511.08280,
title = {Welfare of Sequential Allocation Mechanisms for Indivisible Goods},
author = {Haris Aziz and Thomas Kalinowski and Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.08280},
year = {2018}
}