Related papers: Semi-Random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
In many real-world applications of committee elections, the candidates are associated with certain attributes and the chosen committee is required to satisfy some constraints posed on the candidate attributes. For instance, when dress…
Preference cycles are prevalent in problems of decision-making, and are contradictory when preferences are assumed to be transitive. This contradiction underlies Condorcet's Paradox, a pioneering result of Social Choice Theory, wherein…
We investigate the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) property of scenario decision algorithms, which refers to their ability to produce decisions with an arbitrarily low risk of violating unknown safety constraints, provided a sufficient…
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
This paper introduces the Voting with Random Proposers (VRP) procedure to address the challenges of agenda manipulation in voting. In each round of VRP, a randomly selected proposer suggests an alternative that is voted on against the…
We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
We propose a quantum voting system, in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. Our scheme enables a constitution to violate a quantum analog of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Arrow's Theorem is a claim proved…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
We give an efficient algorithm to strongly refute \emph{semi-random} instances of all Boolean constraint satisfaction problems. The number of constraints required by our algorithm matches (up to polylogarithmic factors) the best-known…
We present the core support criterion, a voting criterion satisfied by Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) that is analogous to the Condorcet criterion but reflective of a different majority rule philosophy. Condorcet methods can be thought of as…
Preference aggregation is a fundamental problem in voting theory, in which public input rankings of a set of alternatives (called preferences) must be aggregated into a single preference that satisfies certain soundness properties. The…
To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever voters' preferences are restricted to the domain, the pairwise majority relation (for an odd number of voters) is transitive and hence a linear order. Determining…
For a $k$-ary predicate $P$, a random instance of CSP$(P)$ with $n$ variables and $m$ constraints is unsatisfiable with high probability when $m \gg n$. The natural algorithmic task in this regime is \emph{refutation}: finding a proof that…
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for choosing one notion over another remain poorly understood.…
Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) is a simple and powerful model for concurrency where agents interact by telling and asking constraints. Since their inception, CCP-languages have been designed for having a strong connection to logic.…
We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split…