Symmetric reduced form voting
Theoretical Economics
2023-04-04 v4
Abstract
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex-ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2207.09253,
title = {Symmetric reduced form voting},
author = {Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.09253},
year = {2023}
}