Positional Voting and Doubly Stochastic Matrices
Combinatorics
2020-08-17 v2 Theoretical Economics
History and Overview
Abstract
We provide elementary proofs of several results concerning the possible outcomes arising from a fixed profile within the class of positional voting systems. Our arguments enable a simple and explicit construction of paradoxical profiles, and we also demonstrate how to choose weights that realize desirable results from a given profile. The analysis ultimately boils down to thinking about positional voting systems in terms of doubly stochastic matrices.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1908.06506,
title = {Positional Voting and Doubly Stochastic Matrices},
author = {Jacqueline Anderson and Brian Camara and John Pike},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.06506},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
13 pages. The title has been changed and various revisions have been made based on referee comments