Related papers: Optimism and Pessimism in Strategic Interactions u…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
In game theory and artificial intelligence, decision making models often involve maximizing expected utility, which does not respect ordinal invariance. In this paper, the author discusses the possibility of preserving ordinal invariance…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…
In many common interactive scenarios, participants lack information about other participants, and specifically about the preferences of other participants. In this work, we model an extreme case of incomplete information, which we term…
Determining an individual's strategic reasoning capability based solely on choice data is a complex task. This complexity arises because sophisticated players might have non-equilibrium beliefs about others, leading to non-equilibrium…
We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We study cautious reasoning in finite sequential games played by agents with perfect recall. Our contribution lies in formulating a definition of prudent rationalizability (Heifetz et al. 2021, BEJTE) as an iterative reduction procedure of…
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct dimensions: a player's type, capturing beliefs about what…
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another -- if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…
Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another---if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The…