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In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…
In an interactive belief model, are the players "commonly meta-certain" of the model itself? This paper formalizes such implicit "common meta-certainty" assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players' beliefs from events…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
This paper studies a dynamic information acquisition model with payoff externalities. Two players can acquire costly information about an unknown state before taking a safe or risky action. Both information and the action taken are private.…
This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
Two-player, turn-based, stochastic games with reachability conditions are considered, where the maximizer has no information (he is blind) and is restricted to deterministic strategies whereas the minimizer is perfectly informed. We ask the…
We study decision-making with rational inattention in settings where agents have perception constraints. In such settings, inaccurate prior beliefs or models of others may lead to inattention blindness, where an agent is unaware of its…
We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…