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We extend the Fundamental Theorem of Epistemic Game Theory to games with Baire class one payoffs and locally compact Polish strategy spaces, and under Projective Determinacy, to games with analytically measurable payoffs and arbitrary…
Shortest-path games are two-player zero-sum games played on a graph equipped with integer weights. One player, that we call Min, wants to reach a target set of states while minimising the total weight, and the other one has an antagonistic…
We develop a framework for modelling and reasoning with uncertainty based on accept and reject statements about gambles. It generalises the frameworks found in the literature based on statements of acceptability, desirability, or…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
Training large language model (LLM) agents for adversarial games is often driven by episodic objectives such as win rate. In long-horizon settings, however, payoffs are shaped by latent strategic externalities that evolve over time, so…
Humans exhibit irrational decision-making patterns in response to environmental triggers, such as experiencing an economic loss or gain. In this paper we investigate whether algorithms exhibit the same behavior by examining the observed…
Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information…
Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…
We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
Selective rationalization improves neural network interpretability by identifying a small subset of input features -- the rationale -- that best explains or supports the prediction. A typical rationalization criterion, i.e. maximum mutual…
Robust Optimization has traditionally taken a pessimistic, or worst-case viewpoint of uncertainty which is motivated by a desire to find sets of optimal policies that maintain feasibility under a variety of operating conditions. In this…
In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of…
Humans currently use arguments for explaining choices which are already made, or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice has usually pros and cons of various strengths. In spite of the usefulness of arguments in a decision…
A robot operating in isolation needs to reason over the uncertainty in its model of the world and adapt its own actions to account for this uncertainty. Similarly, a robot interacting with people needs to reason over its uncertainty over…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…