Related papers: Saturating stable matchings
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
We introduce a `concrete complexity' model for studying algorithms for matching in bipartite graphs. The model is based on the "demand query" model used for combinatorial auctions. Most (but not all) known algorithms for bipartite matching…
We present a sufficient condition for the stability property of extremal graph problems that can be solved via Zykov's symmetrisation. Our criterion is stated in terms of an analytic limit version of the problem. We show that, for example,…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Let $k>1$, and let $\mathcal{F}$ be a family of $2n+k-3$ non-empty sets of edges in a bipartite graph. If the union of every $k$ members of $\mathcal{F}$ contains a matching of size $n$, then there exists an $\mathcal{F}$-rainbow matching…
Maximum bipartite matching is a fundamental algorithmic problem which can be solved in polynomial time. We consider a natural variant in which there is a separation constraint: the vertices on one side lie on a path or a grid, and two…
A maximum priority matching is a matching in an undirected graph that maximizes a priority score defined with respect to given vertex priorities. An earlier paper showed how to find maximum priority matchings in unweighted graphs. This…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
We discuss the question whether the existence of perfect matchings in a cubic graph can be seen from the spectrum of its adjacency matrix. For regular graphs in general and for three edge-disjoint perfect matchings in a cubic graph (that…
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In this note we study inhomogeneous random bipartite graphs in random environment. These graphs can be thought of as an extension of the classical Erd\"os-R\'enyi random graphs in a random environment. We show that the expected number of…
Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…