Related papers: Saturating stable matchings
The approach mapping from a matching of bipartite graphs to digraphs has been successfully used for forcing set problem, in this paper, it is extended to uniquely restricted matching problem. We show to determine a uniquely restricted…
We show the existence of rainbow perfect matchings in $\mu n$-bounded edge colourings of Dirac bipartite graphs, for a sufficiently small $\mu>0$. As an application of our results, we obtain several results on the existence of rainbow…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Z-mapping graph is a balanced bipartite graph $G$ of a digraph $D$ by split each vertex of $D$ into a pair of vertices of $G$. Based on the property of the $G$, it is proved that if $D$ is strong connected and $G$ is Hamiltonian, then $D$…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
In this paper we study the main characteristics of some evaluation codes parameterized by the edges of a bipartite graph with a perfect matching.
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
We consider the stable assignment problem on a graph with nonnegative real capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices, in which the preferences of agents are given via diversifying choice functions. We prove that for any input of…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The Total Matching Polytope generalizes the Stable Set Polytope and the Matching Polytope. In this paper, we give the perfect formulation for Trees and we derive two new families of valid inequalities, the balanced biclique inequalities…
It follows from known results that every regular tripartite hypergraph of positive degree, with $n$ vertices in each class, has matching number at least $n/2$. This bound is best possible, and the extremal configuration is unique. Here we…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
We are given a bipartite graph that contains at least one perfect matching and where each edge is colored from a set $Q=\{c_1,c_2,\ldots,c_q}\$. Let $Q_i=\set{e\in E(G):c(e)=c_i}$, where $c(e)$ denotes the color of $e$. The perfect matching…
Saturation is a fundamental game-semantic property satisfied by strategies that interpret higher-order concurrent programs. It states that the strategy must be closed under certain rearrangements of moves, and corresponds to the intuition…
We revisit the problem of existence of stable systems of contracts with arbitrary sets of contracts. We show that stable sets of contracts exists if choices of agents satisfy path-independence. We call such choice functions Plott functions.…