Related papers: Saturating stable matchings
We study the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of preferences where ties, as well as lower quotas, may appear on both sides of the bipartition. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, where each vertex in $A…
If $G$ is a bipartite graph, Hall's theorem \cite{H35} gives a condition for the existence of a matching of $G$ covering one side of the bipartition. This theorem admits a well-known algorithmic proof involving the repeated search of…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
Colloquially, there are two groups, $n$ men and $n$ women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching.…
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective for each leader is to reach a state…
We prove existence and uniqueness of solutions, continuous dependence from the initial datum and stability with respect to the boundary condition in a class of initial--boundary value problems for systems of balance laws. The particular…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different…
Laplace operators on finite compact metric graphs are considered under the assumption that matching conditions at graph vertices are of $\delta$ and $\delta'$ types. Assuming rational independence of edge lengths, necessary and sufficient…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
We consider the Stochastic Matching problem, which is motivated by applications in kidney exchange and online dating. In this problem, we are given an undirected graph. Each edge is assigned a known, independent probability of existence and…
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the…
The 2-colorable perfect matching problem asks whether a graph can be colored with two colors so that each node has exactly one neighbor with the same color as itself. We prove that this problem is NP-complete, even when restricted to…
Topological data analysis can provide insight on the structure of weighted graphs and digraphs. However, some properties underlying a given (di)graph are hardly mappable to simplicial complexes. We introduce \textit{steady} and…
Gradual advancement of control technology gives rise to the studies of the stability of linear systems. The stability of the linear multiagent system is motivated by increasing utilization of agent dynamics together with the number of…