Related papers: Nash equilibrium seeking under partial-decision in…
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
A key feature of wireless communications is the spatial reuse. However, the spatial aspect is not yet well understood for the purpose of designing efficient spectrum sharing mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework of spatial…
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that requires one…
We study generalized games with full row rank equality constraints and we provide a strikingly simple proof of strong monotonicity of the associated KKT operator. This allows us to show linear convergence to a variational equilibrium of the…
In this paper, we consider a distributed learning problem in a subnetwork zero-sum game, where agents are competing in different subnetworks. These agents are connected through time-varying graphs where each agent has its own cost function…
In this paper, we consider a continuous-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in subnetwork zero-sum games, which is a generalization of deterministic subnetwork zero-sum games and discrete-type Bayesian zero-sum games. In…
We propose an integral Nash equilibrium seeking control (I-NESC) law which steers the multi-agent system composed of a special class of linear agents to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium in noncooperative strongly monotone games.…
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems subject to heterogeneous uncertainty on the expected valued cost functions of the individual agents, where we assume no prior knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the…
This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…
When multiple users share a common link in direct transmission, packet loss and network collision may occur due to the simultaneous arrival of traffics at the source node. To tackle this problem, users may resort to an indirect path: the…
In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of…
In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's…
We consider seeking a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a monotone game, played by dynamic agents which are modeled as a class of lower-triangular nonlinear uncertain dynamics with external disturbances. We establish a general framework that…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We study Nash equilibria learning of a general-sum stochastic game with an unknown transition probability density function. Agents take actions at the current environment state and their joint action influences the transition of the…
We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games…