Related papers: On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead…
In this paper we consider the Stochastic Matching problem, which is motivated by applications in kidney exchange and online dating. We are given an undirected graph in which every edge is assigned a probability of existence and a positive…
A set $S$ of vertices of a graph is a defensive alliance if, for each element of $S$, the majority of its neighbours is in $S$. We consider the notion of local minimality in this paper. We are interested in locally minimal defensive…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of…
We study the complexity of the problem of searching for a set of patterns that separate two given sets of strings. This problem has applications in a wide variety of areas, most notably in data mining, computational biology, and in…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
A Fixed-Parameter Tractable (\FPT) $\rho$-approximation algorithm for a minimization (resp. maximization) parameterized problem $P$ is an FPT algorithm that, given an instance $(x, k)\in P$ computes a solution of cost at most $k \cdot…
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
Given a graph G, a matching is a subset of edges of G that do not share an endpoint. A matching M is uniquely restricted if the subgraph induced by the endpoints of the edges of M has exactly one perfect matching. Given a graph G and a…
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…
For a two-sided ($n$ men/$n$ women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. The popular matchings problem can be defined as follows: Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…