Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings
Abstract
We study the classical problem of matching agents to objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead of asking the agents to report their complete preferences, our goal is to learn a desirable matching from partial preferences, specifically a matching that is necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) or necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) under any completion of the partial preferences. We focus on the top- model in which agents reveal a prefix of their preference rankings. We design efficient algorithms to check if a given matching is NPO or NRM, and to check whether such a matching exists given top- partial preferences. We also study online algorithms for eliciting partial preferences adaptively, and prove bounds on their competitive ratio.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2007.09079,
title = {Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings},
author = {Hadi Hosseini and Vijay Menon and Nisarg Shah and Sujoy Sikdar},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.09079},
year = {2021}
}