Related papers: On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
Consider a random graph model where each possible edge $e$ is present independently with some probability $p_e$. Given these probabilities, we want to build a large/heavy matching in the randomly generated graph. However, the only way we…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that leads to a stable matching in which each…
We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with nonnegative integer edge capacities $b(e)\in{\mathbb…
In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching…
A set $D$ of vertices of a graph is a \emph{defensive alliance} if, for each element of $D$, the majority of its neighbours are in $D$. We consider the notion of local minimality in this paper. We are interested in finding a locally minimal…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We consider the following stochastic matching problem on both weighted and unweighted graphs: A graph $G(V, E)$ along with a parameter $p \in (0, 1)$ is given in the input. Each edge of $G$ is realized independently with probability $p$.…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and ranks on the edges denote preferences of the agents over posts. A matching M in G is rank-maximal if it matches the maximum number of…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their…
The stochastic matching problem deals with finding a maximum matching in a graph whose edges are unknown but can be accessed via queries. This is a special case of stochastic $k$-set packing, where the problem is to find a maximum packing…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…