Related papers: Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria,…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
We propose a toy model for a stochastic description of the competition between two athletes of unequal strength, whose average strength difference is represented by a parameter $d$. The athletes interact through the choice of their…
We consider the problem of modeling competitive diffusion in real world social networks via the notion of ChoiceGAPs which combine choice logic programs due to Sacca` and Zaniolo and Generalized Annotated Programs due to Kifer and…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…
A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented for networked games. We assume an incomplete information available to each player about the other players' actions. The players communicate over a strongly connected digraph to…
This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…