Stochastic stability in spatial games
Statistical Mechanics
2009-11-10 v1 Populations and Evolution
Abstract
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple Nash equilibria is analyzed. In particular, we construct an example of a spatial game with three strategies, where stochastic stability of Nash equilibria depends on the number of players and the kind of dynamics.
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0409647,
title = {Stochastic stability in spatial games},
author = {Jacek Miekisz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0409647},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
13 pages, to appear in J. Stat. Phys