Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games
Populations and Evolution
2007-05-23 v1
Abstract
We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.q-bio/0409028,
title = {Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games},
author = {Maciej Bukowski and Jacek Miekisz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:q-bio/0409028},
year = {2007}
}
Comments
21 pages, to appear in Int. J. Game Theory