When "Better" is better than "Best"
Theoretical Economics
2020-11-03 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the better-response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibrium whenever there is one, whereas best-response dynamics fails to converge, as it is trapped.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2011.00239,
title = {When "Better" is better than "Best"},
author = {Ben Amiet and Andrea Collevecchio and Kais Hamza},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.00239},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
8 pages, 1 figure