Related papers: Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks
We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…
We investigate the fluctuations induced by irrationality in simple games with a large number of competing players. We show that Nash equilibria in such games are ``weakly'' stable: irrationality propagates and amplifies through players'…
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first-…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…
We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…