Co-evolutionary games on networks
Disordered Systems and Neural Networks
2009-11-07 v1 Statistical Mechanics
Abstract
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game.
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0208273,
title = {Co-evolutionary games on networks},
author = {Holger Ebel and Stefan Bornholdt},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0208273},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
9 pages RevTeX, 5 figures PostScript