Related papers: Delegating via Quitting Games
Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assistant COQ which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and…
Throughout the history of games, representing the abilities of the various agents acting on behalf of the players has been a central concern. With increasingly sophisticated games emerging, these simulations have become more realistic, but…
In multi-agent settings, game theory is a natural framework for describing the strategic interactions of agents whose objectives depend upon one another's behavior. Trajectory games capture these complex effects by design. In competitive…
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as…
In this paper we introduce a qualitative decision and game theory based on belief (B) and desire (D) rules. We show that a group of agents acts as if it is maximizing achieved joint goals.
The recent adoption of machine learning as a tool in real world decision making has spurred interest in understanding how these decisions are being made. Counterfactual Explanations are a popular interpretable machine learning technique…
We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state of the world. The principal can design any direct mechanism, including stochastic ones.…
People often interact repeatedly: with relatives, through file sharing, in politics, etc. Many such interactions are reciprocal: reacting to the actions of the other. In order to facilitate decisions regarding reciprocal interactions, we…
Actor systems are a flexible model of concurrent and distributed programming, which are efficiently implementable, and avoid many classic concurrency bugs by construction. However actor systems must still deal with the challenge of messages…
This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how…
Online games are dynamic environments where players interact with each other, which offers a rich setting for understanding how players negotiate their way through the game to an ultimate victory. This work studies online player…
We study preference learning through recommendations in multi-agent game settings, where a moderator repeatedly interacts with agents whose utility functions are unknown. In each round, the moderator issues action recommendations and…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
Biological intelligence can learn to solve many diverse tasks in a data efficient manner by re-using basic knowledge and skills from one task to another. Furthermore, many of such skills are acquired without explicit supervision in an…
When designing or analyzing multi-agent systems, a fundamental problem is responsibility ascription: to specify which agents are responsible for the joint outcome of their behaviors and to which extent. We model strategic multi-agent…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of…
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning…