Related papers: Delegating via Quitting Games
Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are…
We study the problem of learning a good set of policies, so that when combined together, they can solve a wide variety of unseen reinforcement learning tasks with no or very little new data. Specifically, we consider the framework of…
The question of how an effective and efficient communication system can emerge in a population of agents that need to solve a particular task attracts more and more attention from researchers in many fields, including artificial…
Can artificial agents learn to assist others in achieving their goals without knowing what those goals are? Generic reinforcement learning agents could be trained to behave altruistically towards others by rewarding them for altruistic…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
Diplomacy is a seven-player non-stochastic, non-cooperative game, where agents acquire resources through a mix of teamwork and betrayal. Reliance on trust and coordination makes Diplomacy the first non-cooperative multi-agent benchmark for…
This paper introduces a reinforcement learning framework that enables controllable and diverse player behaviors without relying on human gameplay data. Existing approaches often require large-scale player trajectories, train separate models…
Repeated AI assistance can improve immediate task performance while reducing the skill available for future independent work. We develop a mathematical framework for this long-run tradeoff. The model tracks two state variables: a latent…
Why do some investors delegate financial decisions to supposed experts? We report a laboratory experiment designed to disentangle four possible motives. Almost 600 investors drawn from the Prolific subject pool choose whether or not to…
We anticipate increased instances of humans and AI systems working together in what we refer to as a hybrid team. The increase in collaboration is expected as AI systems gain proficiency and their adoption becomes more widespread. However,…
Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…
Diplomacy is one of the most sophisticated activities in human society, involving complex interactions among multiple parties that require skills in social reasoning, negotiation, and long-term strategic planning. Previous AI agents have…
As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act…
Consider a setting where a pre-trained agent is operating in an environment and a human operator can decide to temporarily terminate its operation and take-over for some duration of time. These kind of scenarios are common in human-machine…
Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a weakness of liquid democracy is that a small subset of…
A designer offers vertically-differentiated positions to agents in the absence of transfers. Agents have private outside options and may reject their offers ex-post. The designer has preferences over the quantity of agents who accept each…
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer is given a menu, or a…
This paper studies the relations between agent performances and their intellective abilities in mix-games in which there are two groups of agents: one group plays a minority game, and the other plays a majority game. These two groups have…
Liquid democracy is a mechanism for the division of labor in decision-making through the transitive delegation of influence. In essence, all individuals possess the autonomy to determine the issues with which they will engage directly,…
We present an extended version of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which agents with limited memory receive recommendations about the unknown opponent to decide whether to play with. Since agents can receive more than one…