Related papers: Delegating via Quitting Games
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
This paper reviews an experiment in human-computer interaction, where interaction takes place when humans attempt to teach a computer to play a strategy board game. We show that while individually learned models can be shown to improve the…
The partial alignment and conflict of autonomous agents lead to mixed-motive scenarios in many real-world applications. However, agents may fail to cooperate in practice even when cooperation yields a better outcome. One well known reason…
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal…
Liquid democracy is a form of transitive delegative democracy that has received a flurry of scholarly attention from the computer science community in recent years. In its simplest form, every agent starts with one vote and may have other…
Game theory provides a framework for studying communication dynamics and emergent phenomena arising from rational agent interactions. We present a model framework for the Volunteer's Dilemma with four key contributions: (1) formulating it…
Team adaptation to new cooperative tasks is a hallmark of human intelligence, which has yet to be fully realized in learning agents. Previous work on multi-agent transfer learning accommodate teams of different sizes, heavily relying on the…
Training a team to complete a complex task via multi-agent reinforcement learning can be difficult due to challenges such as policy search in a large joint policy space, and non-stationarity caused by mutually adapting agents. To facilitate…
Automated testing of computer games is a challenging problem, especially when lengthy scenarios have to be tested. Automating such a scenario boils down to finding the right sequence of interactions given an abstract description of the…
A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to execute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in network architectures that is driven by the sharing of…
Human behaviors are regularized by a variety of norms or regulations, either to maintain orders or to enhance social welfare. If artificially intelligent (AI) agents make decisions on behalf of human beings, we would hope they can also…
Humans possess innate collaborative capacities. However, effective teamwork often remains challenging. This study delves into the feasibility of collaboration within teams of rational, self-interested agents who engage in teamwork without…
Although many game-theoretic models replicate real interactions that often rely on natural language, explicit study of games where language is central to strategic interaction remains limited. This paper introduces the \emph{conversation…
Our objective in this paper is to develop a machinery that makes a given organizational strategic plan resilient to the actions of competitor agents (adverse environmental actions). We assume that we are given a goal tree representing…
Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI agent (for example because its source code is known), which…
When should we delegate decisions to AI systems? While the value alignment literature has developed techniques for shaping AI values, less attention has been paid to how to determine, under uncertainty, when imperfect alignment is good…
Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff,…
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the…
We analyze the pedestrian evacuation of a rectangular room with a single door considering a Lattice Gas scheme with the addition of behavioral aspects of the pedestrians. The movement of the individuals is based on random and rational…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…