On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy
Multiagent Systems
2018-11-21 v4 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1802.08020,
title = {On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy},
author = {Daan Bloembergen and Davide Grossi and Martin Lackner},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08020},
year = {2018}
}
Comments
17 pages, 3 figures. This paper (without Appendix) appears in the proceedings of AAAI'19