Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-10-08 v2 Data Structures and Algorithms
Abstract
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2403.07558,
title = {Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy},
author = {Shiri Alouf-Heffetz and Tanmay Inamdar and Pallavi Jain and Yash More and Nimrod Talmon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.07558},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
Accepted in 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems(AAMAS 2024)