Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-06-16 v1 Computational Complexity
Multiagent Systems
Abstract
Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative actions on elections where voters can have ties, extending the definitions of the election systems (when necessary) to handle voters with ties. We show that for natural election systems allowing ties can both increase and decrease the complexity of manipulation and bribery, and we state a general result on the effect of voters with ties on the complexity of control.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1506.04722,
title = {Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties},
author = {Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1506.04722},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
A version of this paper will appear in ADT-2015