Power in Liquid Democracy
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-10-15 v1 Artificial Intelligence
Abstract
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of relevant parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2010.07070,
title = {Power in Liquid Democracy},
author = {Yuzhe Zhang and Davide Grossi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.07070},
year = {2020}
}