Related papers: An LP Approach for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Rep…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

Desensitization addresses safe optimal planning under parametric uncertainties by providing sensitivity function-based risk estimates. This paper expands upon the existing work on desensitization in optimal control to address safe planning…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…

Two-player (antagonistic) games on (possibly stochastic) graphs are a prevalent model in theoretical computer science, notably as a framework for reactive synthesis. Optimal strategies may require randomisation when dealing with inherently…

Using semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile evolutionary equation (PEE) for repeated finite games is obtained. By virtue of PEE, the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are developed for general finite games. A formula is then…

Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an \epsilon-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every \epsilon >0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the…

We consider the problem of two-player zero-sum games. This problem is formulated as a min-max Markov game in the literature. The solution of this game, which is the min-max payoff, starting from a given state is called the min-max value of…

We consider turn-based stochastic two-player games with a combination of a parity condition that must hold surely, that is in all possible outcomes, and of a parity condition that must hold almost-surely, that is with probability 1. The…

We study a stochastic differential game with $N$ competitive players in a linear-quadratic framework with ergodic cost, where $d$-dimensional diffusion processes govern the state dynamics with an unknown common drift (matrix). Assuming a…

We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…

In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

Two-player zero-sum games of infinite duration and their quantitative versions are used in verification to model the interaction between a controller (Eve) and its environment (Adam). The question usually addressed is that of the existence…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…