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Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

No-regret learning has been widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. However, there is still a lack of regret analysis for network stochastic zero-sum games, where players competing in two subnetworks only…

This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…

In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed…

The Competing Bandits framework is a recently emerging area that integrates multi-armed bandits in online learning with stable matching in game theory. While conventional models assume that all players and arms are constantly available, in…

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…

Our paper studies the setting of players using no-regret algorithms in various two-player games. We address whether having stronger regret guarantees or playing against an opponent with weaker regret guarantees yields higher utilities for…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

No-regret self-play learning dynamics have become one of the premier ways to solve large-scale games in practice. Accelerating their convergence via improving the regret of the players over the naive $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound after $T$ rounds has…

We present an algorithm which attains O(\sqrt{T}) internal (and thus external) regret for finite games with partial monitoring under the local observability condition. Recently, this condition has been shown by (Bartok, Pal, and Szepesvari,…

In this paper, we consider a distributed learning problem in a subnetwork zero-sum game, where agents are competing in different subnetworks. These agents are connected through time-varying graphs where each agent has its own cost function…

In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…

No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy…

Regret minimization has played a key role in online learning, equilibrium computation in games, and reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we describe a general model-free RL method for no-regret learning based on repeated…

It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this…

Counterfactual regret minimization is a family of algorithms of no-regret learning dynamics capable of solving large-scale imperfect information games. We propose implementing this algorithm as a series of dense and sparse matrix and vector…

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic…

We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential…

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form…