Related papers: Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
In robust optimization, the uncertainty set is used to model all possible outcomes of uncertain parameters. In the classic setting, one assumes that this set is provided by the decision maker based on the data available to her. Only…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…