Related papers: Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

In this paper, we study networks of positive linear systems subject to time-invariant and random uncertainties. We present linear matrix inequalities for checking the stability of the whole network around the origin with prescribed…

Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…

In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…

We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…

We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…

The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…

We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…

To solve a real-world problem, the modeler usually needs to make a trade-off between model complexity and usefulness. This is also true for robust optimization, where a wide range of models for uncertainty, so-called uncertainty sets, have…

We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…

In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…

A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…

In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…

We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation…

The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…

This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…

We reexamine the classical linear regression model when the model is subject to two types of uncertainty: (i) some of covariates are either missing or completely inaccessible, and (ii) the variance of the measurement error is undetermined…

We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…

In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…