Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-01-04 v1 Data Structures and Algorithms
Abstract
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test substitutability of weak preferences. Interestingly, the algorithm is faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. by a linear factor on the domain of strict preferences.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1201.0432,
title = {Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences},
author = {Haris Aziz and Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1201.0432},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
7 pages