Related papers: Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

We study the problem of linear feature selection when features are highly correlated. Such settings pose two fundamental challenges. First, how should model similarity be defined? Simply counting features in common can be misleading: two…

When making important decisions such as choosing health insurance or a school, people are often uncertain what levels of attributes will suit their true preference. After choice, they might realize that their uncertainty resulted in a…

We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…

In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…

Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.

We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…

We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convene an event, and needs to choose a subset of agents to be invited. Agents have preferences over how many attendees should be at the event and possibly also who the attendees…

In this paper, we mainly study the robust stability of linear continuous systems with parameter uncertainties, a more general kind of uncertainties for system matrices is considered, i.e., entries of system matrices are rational functions…

This paper studies a risk-sensitive decision-making problem under uncertainty. It considers a decision-making process that unfolds over a fixed number of stages, in which a decision-maker chooses among multiple alternatives, some of which…

This paper studies binary linear programming problems in the presence of uncertainties that may cause solution values to change during implementation. This type of uncertainty, termed implementation uncertainty, is modeled explicitly…

ML models have errors when used for predictions. The errors are unknown but can be quantified by model uncertainty. When multiple ML models are trained using the same training points, their model uncertainties may be statistically…

The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…

We study the problem of online learning in two-sided non-stationary matching markets, where the objective is to converge to a stable match. In particular, we consider the setting where one side of the market, the arms, has fixed known set…

We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…

The situation assessment problem is considered, in terms of object, condition, activity, and plan recognition, based on data coming from the real-word {em via} various sensors. It is shown that uncertainty issues are linked both to the…

The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…

We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…

Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…

We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…

Accurately estimating uncertainties in neural network predictions is of great importance in building trusted DNNs-based models, and there is an increasing interest in providing accurate uncertainty estimation on many tasks, such as security…